Northern's 195104 after derailing at Grange-over-Sands. RAIB.

A hidden void caused by a partially buried pipe, damaged by a tamper during routine maintenance, led to a passenger train being derailed.

Northern's 195104 after derailing at Grange-over-Sands. RAIB.

A hidden void caused by a partially buried pipe, damaged by a tamper during routine maintenance, led to a passenger train being derailed.

A pair of Northern Class 195s (195104 and 195133) were travelling west at 56mph when the front unit came off the rails on the approach to Grange-over-Sands station on March 22, 2024. It was left beached on the ballast 184 metres from the point it derailed.

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) reported that a “large void” was found in the embankment, but had remained hidden until the train travelled over it. It said the pipe, used to pump water under the line from a neighbouring golf course into Morecambe Bay, was damaged two days earlier, with “ineffective” communication allowing water to be discharged into the earthworks for two days and material being washed away.

The report said the pipe was only partially buried since its installation in 2016 as a temporary measure to reduce flooding, but Network Rail had allowed it to “become permanent without applying the relevant asset management procedures”.

The void in the embankment at Grange-over-Sands. NETWORK RAIL.

Investigators found there was no sign to warn the tamping team of its existence, and paint sprayed onto the line the day before the pipe was damaged was “probably not applied” to the Down line.

RAIB found the golf club had not been told about the damage so was unaware the pump on its land which pushed water through needed switching off. Despite the damage being reported to the Manchester rail operating centre, no action was taken.

The incident controller was told twice that someone needed to be sent to the site to assess the damage, which occurred at around 0130 on March 20. The controller tried contacting the senior asset engineer at 0222 but had to leave a voicemail. They also followed up with an e-mail, RAIB said.

RAIB's report said the engineer rang the control centre back three hours later and said they had "mistakenly left their phone on silent", explaining they were "aware of the pipe and that it was not connected to a pump".

The enginner said they would arrange a repair, and at 0718 on March 21 made an internal request to instruct contractors to replace and relay the pipe at a greater depth to prevent it from being struck again. Just under 24 hours later, at 0605 on March 22, the Northern service derailed.

RAIB also found short staffing levels at Network Rail’s Carnforth maintenance delivery unit “allowed a non-compliance with Network Rail standards to become normalised”.

The tamper unit involved in the maintenance work at Grange-over-Sands. RAIB.

The report highlighted how a track quality supervisor used Automated Intelligent Video Review footage to assess the site beforehand rather than completing an advance walkout, where the pipe could have been marked. Despite not being compliant with Network Rail standards, management had taken no action.

Since the derailment Network Rail has installed a permanent structure to protect up to three temporary pipes well below the track bed. RAIB has also recommended NR reviews other temporary pumps or drainage assets which have effectively become permanent, and how it improves the ability of tamper operators to detect buried services.

Battery isolation switch on the Class 195 damaged at Grange-over-Sands. RAIB.

It also recommends NR reviews staffing levels at Carnforth, and the Environment Agency leads on a strategy to response to the flooding adjacent to the line at Grange-over-Sands, with RAIB finding those responsible for managing flood water had “not done so effectively, leading to the prolonged need to rely on temporary pumping arrangements”.

Eversholt Rail, owner of the Class 195, should lead a review of the design of the units’ battery isolation switches after the leading carriage struck the parapet, knocking the switch and cutting off power to the cab.

A Northern spokesperson said: “We accept the findings of the RAIB report and are committed to working with Network Rail and the wider industry to improve railway safety. We would like to thank our traincrew, who remained calm and professional in very challenging circumstances to help the customers on-board and send a warning message to the signaller so they could stop trains on the adjacent line.”

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