Why Leeds' new White Rose station is late - and when could it finally open to passengers

Work has paused on the new Leeds station and few have any notion of when it can expect to welcome passenger services, Andrew Mourant reports.

It wasn’t meant to be this way.

The project to build White Rose station on the outskirts of south-west Leeds was intended as a model of efficient delivery and budgeting.

Construction began in March 2022, and most of the heavy lifting has been done. Both platforms have been installed, the lift/stair buildings constructed, and link bridges connecting the main station to the platform manoeuvred into position.

Then suddenly, and without explanation, work ground to a halt in March 2024.

Those responsible for delivering the project are West Yorkshire Combined Authority (WYCA), Munroe K (which owns the nearby White Rose retail park), Leeds City Council, Network Rail and the Department for Transport. The contractor is Hull-based rail infrastructure specialist Spencer Group, although whether or not that continues remains to be seen.

South-west Leeds is growing rapidly. Around White Rose is a retail park, a business park, a college, and Churwell new village (a large new housing development).

The nearest station, Cottingley (built in 1988) sits on the Leeds-Huddersfield line, part of the Transpennine route. Its closure is planned for when White Rose opens. But, as things stand, Cottingley is enjoying an unexpectedly prolonged life.

Shortly after work stopped last year, RAIL sought to uncover what was going on. All we were told was that there had been a “temporary pause” following an “unforeseen increase” in project costs. There was to be “a thorough evaluation of future funding sources” to ensure completion. WYCA, Spencer and Munroe K all declined to elaborate.

This collective silence made a stark contrast to the early fanfare.

White Rose was meant to be a case study of how things should be done - a poster example of Rail Project SPEED (swift, pragmatic and efficient enhancement delivery). This was conceived by the DfT and Network Rail during COVID “to pioneer new ways of working that will halve the time and reduce the cost of delivering critical infrastructure”.

Spencer’s pre-construction director Simon Bethell claimed White Rose was “a great example” of SPEED, “where we are all aligned to deliver optimum value in the fastest possible manner while ensuring engineering… and operational safety standards are adhered to”.

Meanwhile, Munroe K was cheerfully forecasting that the station would be used by 343,000 passengers annually, assuming a two trains per hour service.

According to NR’s website, SPEED has “two core principles… to halve the time and slash the cost of project delivery.”

It was “to be revolutionary… not follow rules at the expense of common sense or better outcomes.”

It would “remove layers of process and bureaucracy that add little value, while freeing up time to focus on doing the things that matter, safely”.

Working with DfT, NR identified six infrastructure projects of differing scale and stages of development, all of which “developed proposals to reduce timescales and cost”.

And the reality at White Rose? The original £26.5 million budget, including money to cover contingencies, has all been spent without any firm completion date in the offing.

A year on, WYCA once more declined to answer questions, so RAIL submitted a Freedom of information (FOI) request.

Some details remain unexplained. The “unforeseen costs” cited were blamed on construction taking place at a time of “unprecedented inflation”. There was “programme slippage from significant delays resulting from contractual negotiations, re-design, land transfers, delivery methodology revisions, and mine workings mitigation”.

So much for Project SPEED. Hanging in the air are questions relating to the expected final cost: who will pay; and whether Spencer Group will be allowed to finish the job.

In WYCA’s words: “Work is ongoing to develop a preferred approach… in terms of funding and contractual arrangements.”

A report is being prepared “that will seek greater clarity around the timescale and approach for… completion”.

As for retaining Spencer, WYCA says there’s a need “to clearly understand the issues faced in remobilising [resuming] the project”.

These include funding, land ownership, and commercial and legal matters. Only then can “a fully informed” decision be made.

“It is currently being determined who the delivery client and their appointed principal contractor will be,” it said.

For all its flag-waving over Project SPEED, NR’s role in White Rose has been mainly advisory - “focusing on asset protection”.

That means working with developers and third parties “to give advice and assistance on matters of safety, construction and infrastructure, reducing the risk of working on or near the railway”.

An NR spokesman said: “We have provided expertise throughout. As with any complex project, unexpected challenges need to be dealt with as they emerge, and we will continue to offer our support in resolving these.

“We’re working closely with all partners, including TRU [Transpennine Route Upgrade], to ensure prompt completion. We’ll reflect on lessons learned, ensuring all parties can take those forward into future projects.”

Of the £26.5m already spent, £5m came from the Leeds Public Transport Infrastructure Programme (LPTIP), £5m from the New Stations Fund (NSF), £12m from the Transforming Cities Fund (TCF), and £4.5m from Munroe K.

Work to be completed includes: external cladding; internal fit out; mechanical and electrical works, including lift installations; external works and operational railway works, including signalling, customer information systems; the access highway and associated junction and S278 works (where developers form a legal agreement with the council to make road alterations/improvements).

WYCA’s response to RAIL’s FoI request raised further questions.

What was the nature of the re-design and why was it needed?

What does “delivery methodology revision” mean?

One FoI answer implies that the nature of old mine workings (hence the need to “mitigate” them) wasn't known at the outset. But surely these would have been well-mapped?

It took WYCA 17 days to refer RAIL to a committee paper from May. This shed a little more light, although how (and by whom) the rest of the bill is going to be paid was discussed behind closed doors.

WYCA said it had no more to add, although White Rose is due to be discussed again this month (July).

One complication is that closing Cottingley station needs to tie in with completing the Transpennine Route Upgrade, due by the end of 2026.

Opening White Rose would have meant two stations within half a mile, and keeping Cottingley (which mainly serves residential areas) was considered impractical.

According to Munroe K’s website, it was decided that for technical train/platform interface reasons, building at the originally proposed site (on the curve towards Morley) was not possible.

It’s unclear when the change was decided upon and what (if any) implications there were for delivery times and cost. WYCA declined to comment on this.

However, RAIL understands it went down badly with White Rose retailers, who saw the new site as less attractive, even though the repositioned station will be closer to the business park and college.

Further slippages would pose “a significant risk to the TRU scheme in the area of Cottingley station”, says WYCA.

TRU’s upgrade team, through Network Rail, has been drawn in to help WYCA explore ways of completing the scheme “with [its] associated high-level costs”.

TRU confirmed that the station is about 70% finished “and built to a high standard”.

It identified “ten key constraints to completion”, described as “blockers” (although WYCA doesn’t specify what these are), and recommending that these are progressed in a “matter of weeks.”

Among the suggested next steps are: appointing a “single point” project manager; determining strategies for delivery and procurement; and sorting out site road access works.

Work undertaken to date indicates that “subject to quick decision-making and mobilisation”, White Rose station could be open by January 2027, “which would mitigate any impacts on TRU’s operational timescale”.

But time is tight. “Intensive work will be required as a matter of urgency” to agree the way forward, with “specialist input/support…required”.

WYCA now envisages TRU overseeing completion of the station, although it remains spooked by the implications for its budget: “Risks associated with the potential ongoing funding of the scheme… will need to be fully understood in order to avoid a situation where open-ended financial responsibility falls on the … public sector.”

Besides picking over all the contracts, WYCA is trying to “close out” a number of blockers as it strives to “de-risk and narrow down the likely range of costs”.

But what are those risks? It seems reasonable to ask, given that public money is involved, but WYCA has chosen to keep these exempt from public scrutiny.

Once all that has been done, WYCA will report back and seek approval “to draw down the outstanding funding required”, and provide “greater clarity around the timescale and approach for… project completion”.

What to make of all this?

WYCA admits that there are “a number of lessons to date” and anticipates that down the line its scrutiny committee may take a hard look at what went wrong.

Whether taxpayers will ever get to discover the details is another matter.

And nor does the handling of White Rose inspire much confidence in WYCA’s ability to oversee the West Yorkshire Mass Transit scheme, where we are promised “spades in the ground” by 2028.

Perhaps best not to hold your breath…