Unlike other transport modes, rail has control of its means of way and access to the system. It is therefore in a position to optimise its output, essentially the timetable for passenger and freight trains, with the expectation of high service delivery standards.
For Britain’s rail network, there has always been a need for significant investment, either from the private sector or the state. In the early years, where lines were promoted, funding for construction came from shareholders who often backed local routes, to allow improved access to freight markets for local producers.
Unlike other transport modes, rail has control of its means of way and access to the system. It is therefore in a position to optimise its output, essentially the timetable for passenger and freight trains, with the expectation of high service delivery standards.
For Britain’s rail network, there has always been a need for significant investment, either from the private sector or the state. In the early years, where lines were promoted, funding for construction came from shareholders who often backed local routes, to allow improved access to freight markets for local producers.
Local lines were gradually absorbed into larger groupings, as revenue could not sustain the operating costs or investment needs which could be afforded by larger enterprises.
This trend culminated in the ‘Big Four’ being established in 1923 and which linger in our minds today - the LMS, LNER, GWR and Southern. They generally had a local monopoly, although the flagship Anglo-Scottish routes did bring a competitive market with what is now seen as iconic streamlined expresses designed to maximise the potential.
After nationalisation, innovation was pushed to one side, with an emphasis on improving the efficiency of existing equipment. But with government focus on road investment and a rapid rise in private car ownership, together with increasingly efficient road haulage with heavier lorries, the rail industry was soon in trouble.
Investment was poorly directed in steam locomotives that were already obsolescent and large marshalling yards to shunt outdated low-capacity wagons that were rapidly failing out of use. What was needed was life cycle renewal and product development.
There was a guiding mind in the form of the British Transport Commission (BTC), which sought to influence the policy of the Railway Executive. It achieved some progress with the greater use of diesel multiple units, which brought the introduction of the Derby Lightweight vehicles that transformed passenger numbers on routes where they were allocated.
At least a decade was lost as a result of decisions not to pursue the development of LMS and Southern prototype diesels or to proceed with the proposed LNER dieselisation of East Coast Main Line services. A similar judgement was made not to develop the GWR gas turbine prototypes.
For freight operations, the BTC believed that a move to air-braked wagons was essential to allow higher payloads and operating speed. But again, this was rebuffed on the grounds that services would need to be duplicated to operate vehicles with different braking systems.
These past events pick up on RAIL’ s question as to whether we are on track for real change, as a result of a new guiding mind in the form of Great British Railways.
There are parallels with what was inherited by the BTC (later to become the British Railways Board), in that the status quo is not an option.
There are also differences: instead of the threat caused by the growth in private car ownership, there is now a very different pattern of demand for travel, brought about by the widespread ability to avoid a journey by working from home.
The latest statistics for rail journeys published by the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) reveal that the use of season tickets has plummeted, and no longer provides the core income it once did.
Instead, journeys have become more flexible, with cheaper fare options being used. This has seen a significant difference between post-pandemic user growth and fare box income.
Discretionary trips for leisure purposes have become more important. But the journey experience is often poor, owing to rolling stock that was designed to accommodate a peak requirement that no longer exists.
It took the BTC and BR more than two decades to recognise the need for air-conditioned vehicles. And an early task for GBR must be to overhaul what is perceived as acceptable, given the low standard of interior design in recently introduced rolling stock.
This means no more ‘ironing board’ seats, but seating for family groups to sit comfortably at tables, as well as toilet provision on all newly commissioned rolling stock to recognise the needs of an older population and younger families. There should also be no need to bar cyclists at peak periods, and to generally provide more space such as that delivered by converted vehicles on ScotRail tourist routes.
The message is: stop thinking commuter, and instead think journeys made by choice as often these are made for the travel experience itself - and what type of on-board product this needs.
The demand for connectivity has increased from communities that do not have competitive rail services. It has taken a while, but the success of open access operators in providing services for population centres excluded by previous timetable planners (such as Hull and Sunderland) has been widely endorsed.
The withdrawal of inconvenient through services was a mantra followed for a long period, and is alive today - as Avanti’s proposals to remove direct access to Shrewsbury illustrate. The difference now is that instead of losing the service, an open access alternative is proposed.
And do not be fooled that this has a detrimental impact on performance. New services are rigorously evaluated by ORR as part of capacity allocation decisions, and the companies concerned have a much better industrial relations record in avoiding the strike action that has pervaded state-sponsored operators.
Freight movement by rail is further along the scale of life cycle renewal. It has survived the loss of its core coal traffic and reinvented itself as a significant intermodal carrier. Some bulk traffic remains, but this continues to be in decline - the latest example is the loss of traffic that will follow the closure of steel making blast furnaces at Port Talbot.
Network Rail has been ahead of the trend by establishing the Strategic Freight Network, but there is a lack of capacity and geographic reach that must be rectified by GBR.
Rail market share at the largest ports is constrained by the capacity available, and important routes remain to be cleared for carrying full-height containers as well as infrastructure that can accommodate 775-metre train lengths.
Technical innovation such as the provision of automated couplings will bring significant operational and safety benefits, with an ability to monitor train operating performance. Another priority must be small scale in-fill electrification to reach ports such as London Gateway and distribution centres.
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